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Abstract. Many autonomous agents operate in domains in which the co-
operation of their fellow agents cannot be guaranteed. In such domains negoti-
ation is essential to persuade others of the value of co-operation. This paper de-
scribes a general framework for negotiation in which agents exchangeproposals
backedby arguments which summarise the reasons why the proposals should be
accepted.Theargumentationis persuasivebecausethe exchangesare ableto alter
the mental state of the agents involved. The framework is inspired by our work
in the domain of business process managementand is explained using examples
from that domain.
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1 Introduction
Negotiation is a key form of interaction in systems composed of multiple autonomous
agents. In such environments, agents often have no inherent control over one another
and so the only way they can inﬂuence one another’s behaviour is by persuasion. In
some cases, the persuadee may require littleor no convincing to act in the way desired
by the persuader, for example because the proposed course of action is consistent with
their plans. However, in other cases, the persuadee may be unwillingto accept the pro-
posal initiallyand must be persuaded to change its beliefs, goals or preferences so that
the proposal, or some variant thereof, is accepted. In either case, the minimum require-
ment fornegotiationis for theagents tobe able to make proposalsto one another.These
proposals can then either be accepted or rejected as is the case in the contract net pro-
tocol [17], for instance. Another level of sophistication occurs when recipients do not
just have the choice of accepting or rejecting proposals, but have the option of making
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Xalapa,Veracruz, Mexico. Enjoying a Mexican CONACYT grant [69068-7245].counter offers to alter aspects of the proposal which are unsatisfactory [16]. An even
more elaborate formof negotiation—argumentation-based—isthat in which parties are
able to send justiﬁcations or arguments along with (counter) proposals indicating why
they should be accepted [11, 13, 18]. Arguments such as: “this is my ﬁnal offer, take
it or leave it”, “last time this job cost $5, I’m not going to pay $10 now”, and “the job
will take longer than usual because one of the workers is off sick” may be necessary to
change the persuadee’s goals or preferences.
This paper deals with argumentation-based negotiation. Because this is a large re-
search topic [9, 19] we limitour scope to argumentation between computationalagents
where a persuader tries to convince a persuadee to undertake a particular problem solv-
ing task (service) on its behalf. We outline the components of a formal model for the
process of argumentation-based negotiation which can ultimately be used to build ne-
gotiatingagentsforreal worldapplications.Whilewe draw onourpreviousworkinthis
area, in this paper we shift our attention from the mechanisms for generating counter
proposals [16] and those for generating and interpreting arguments [13] to the social
aspects of the negotiation. Moreover, we take advantage of the work on Dialogical
Frameworks introduced in [12] to deﬁne the static aspects of the negotiation process:
shared ontology, social relations, communication language and protocol. We deﬁne a
minimal notion of the state of an agent which captures the evolutionary character of
negotiation—enabling the resulting model to recognise different types of arguments
that agents can make in support of their proposals. Finally, we indicate how these argu-
ments can be generated and interpreted by agents.
In the paper we discuss three types of illocutions:(i) threats—failure to accept this
proposal means something negative will happen to the agent; (ii) rewards—acceptance
of this proposal means something positivewill happen to the agent; and (iii) appeals—
the agent should prefer this optionover that alternative for this reason. We realise these
are a subset of the illocutions that are involved in persuasive negotiation (see [9] for a
list based on psychological research), but our emphasis is in providing an overarching
framework inwhich the keycomponents of argumentationcan be described, rather than
providing an exhaustive formalisation of all the argument types which can be found in
theliterature.Weillustratetheseconstructsthrougharunningexampleintroducedinthe
followingsection. The main contributionof this work is, therefore, to provide a formal
framework in whichagents can undertake persuasive negotiationtochange each other’s
beliefs and preferences using an expressive communication language. Moreover, the
framework is neutral with respect to the agent’s internal architecture and imposes few
constraints on its formal resources.
2 Argumentation in Business Process Management
This section describes the scenario which will be used to illustrate the principles and
concepts of our model of argumentation. The scenario is motivated by work in the
ADEPT project [8] which has developed negotiating agents for business process man-
agement applications. In particular, we consider a multi-agent system for managing a
British Telecom (BT) business process—namely, providing a quotation for designing
a network which offers particular services to a customer (Figure 1). The overall pro-cess receives a customer service request as its input and generates as its output a quote
specifying how much it would cost to build a network to realise that service. Here
we consider a subset of the agents involved in this activity: the customer service divi-
sion (CSD) agent, the design division(DD) agent, the surveyor department (SD) agent,
and the various agents who provide the out-sourced service of vetting customers (VC
agents). A full account of all the agents and their negotiations is given in [16].
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The ﬁrst stages of the Provide Customer Quote service involve the CSD agent cap-
turing basic information about the customer and vetting the customer in terms of their
credit worthiness. The latter service is performed by one of the VC agents and ne-
gotiation is used to determine which one is selected. If the customer fails the vetting
procedure, then the quote process terminates. Assuming the customer is satisfactory,
the CSD agent maps their requirements against a service portfolio. If the requirements
can be met by a standard off-the-shelf portfolio item then an immediate quote can be
offered based on previousexamples. In the case of bespoke services the process is more
complex.TheCSDagentnegotiates withtheDDagent fortheserviceofcostingand de-
signingthe desired network service. To prepare a network design it is usually necessary
tohave a detailedplan ofthe existingequipmentat thecustomer’s premises. Sometimes
such plans might not exist and sometimes they may be out of date. In either case, the
DD agent determines whether the customer site(s) should be surveyed. If such a survey
is warranted, the DD agent negotiates with the SD agent for the Survey Customer Site
service. This negotiation differs from the others present in this scenario in that the two
agents are part of the same department. Moreover, the DD agent has a degree of author-
ity over SD. Agent negotiation is still required to set the timings of the service, but the
SD agent cannot simply refuse to perform the service. On completion of the network
design and costing, the DD agent informs the CSD agent which informs the customer
of the service quote. The business process then terminates.
The precise nature of the argumentation which can occur in the aforementioned ne-
gotiations is determined by three main factors: (i) the negotiation arity—pairwise (1
to 1) negotiations (e.g. the CSD and DD agents for the design network service) dif-
fer from 1 to many negotiations (e.g. the CSD and VC agents for the Vet CustomerType Id Parties Content Comments
Threaten 1 CSD-VCs
Match the offer I have from another VC, otherwise I’ll
break off this negotiation.
Threaten to terminatecurrentnego-
tiation thread.
2 CSD-VCs
Make sure you get back to me in the speciﬁed time period
or I won’tinvolveyou in futureroundsof bidding.
Threaten to terminate all future ne-
gotiation threads.
3 DD-SD
If you cannotcompletethe service sooner,I’ll inform your
boss that we missed the deadline because of you.
Threaten to inform outside party of
(perceived)poorperformance.
Reward 4 CSD-DD
If you producethis design by this time we’ll be able to get
the quoteto our major customer ahead of time.
Indicate positive effect of perform-
ing action by speciﬁed time.
5 CSD-VCs
If you vet this customer by this time, I’ll make sure you’re
involvedin subsequentroundsof bidding.
Promise future involvementfor ac-
cepting currentproposal.
Appeal 6 CSD-VCs Last time you vetted this customer, it took this length of
time and cost this much.
Appeal to precedent.
7 CSD-DD
You must complete this design within 48 hours because
company policy says customers must be responded to
within this time frame.
Appeal to (company’s) prevailing
practice.
8 VC-CSD This customer may be in ﬁnancial trouble, therefore more
time is needed to carry out a higher quality vetting.
Appeal to (CSD’s) self interest.
9 DD-CSD
Thedesignwill takelongerthan normalbecauseone of our
surveyorsis on holiday this week.
Revealing new information.
10 SD-DD
Customer has many premises and they all need to be sur-
veyed,thus this servicewill takelonger than normal.
Revealing new information.
Fig.2. Sample arguments in the BT application.
service); (ii) the power relations [2] between the negotiators—most negotiations are
peer-to-peer, but the DD and SD negotiation over the Survey Customer Site service is
an example of boss-to-subordinatenegotiation;and (iii) the organisational relationship
of thenegotiators—somenegotiationsare between agents ofthesame organisation(e.g.
the CSD,DD and SD agents),whileothersare between agentsof differentorganisations
(e.g. the CSD and VC agents). Our experience in the domain shows that the argumen-
tation between agents can be captured by the three types of argument mentioned in
the Introduction—threats, rewards and appeals. Some examples of such arguments are
given in Figure 2.
3 Negotiation model
Our model describes the process of a single encounter negotiation between multiple
agents over a deal. Deals are always between two agents, though an agent may be en-
gaged simultaneously in negotiation with many agents for a given deal. Negotiation
is achieved through the exchange of illocutions in a shared communication language
C
L. The actual exchange of illocutionsis driven by the participatingagents’ individual
needs and goals—something that will not be part of this negotiation model. Neverthe-
less, thisexchange is subjecttosomeminimalshared conventions ontheintendedusage
of theillocutionsin
C
L,and asimplenegotiationprotocol.These conventionsrelateto:
1. The elements that are relevant for the negotiation of a deal—in the form of issues
and values that may evolve as negotiation proceeds.2. The rationality of the participating agents—in terms of some form of preference
relationships or utility functions which enable the agents to evaluate and compare
different proposals.
3. The deliberation capability of the participating agents—in the form of an internal
state in which the agent may register the history of the negotiation as well as the
evolution of its own theoretical elements on which its decisions are founded.
4. The minimal shared meaning of the acceptable illocutions—this is captured in the
way that a received illocution should be interpreted when heard by an agent, and
by making explicitthe conditionsthat enable an agent to use (or ‘generate’) a given
illocutionat a given time.
A minimal set of concepts which are necessary to represent the static components in
automated negotiation are presented in Section 3.1, and the dynamic components—the
concepts of a negotiationthread and a negotiation state—are introduced in Section 3.2.
Social aspects that are relevant for persuasive arguments are dealt with in Section 3.3,
and the process of interpretingand generating illocutionsis illustratedin Section 3.4.
3.1 A Basic Negotiation Ontology
Negotiationrequires communication between the agents and, for it to be unambiguous,
each agent musthave a uniqueidentiﬁer.Wedenotethesetofidentiﬁersof theagentsin-
volvedin anegotiationas
A
g
e
n
t
s
 .The agents involvedin anegotiationwillhave a va-
rietyofsocial relationshipswithone another. These relationshipshave an importantim-
pact upon the persuasion and argumentation process. For instance, prestigiousspeakers
have a large persuasive impact and peers can be persuaded more easily than non-peers
[9]. To model this characteristic, we assume that a general and shared social relation
is deﬁned between the agents. This relation can be modelled as a binary function over
a set of social roles, denoted as
R
o
l
e
s. In the BT scenario, for example,
R
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g. Finally, we assume that agents, when ne-
gotiating, interchange illocutions in a common communication language
C
L deﬁned
over a set of illocutionaryparticles whosepropositionalcontentis expressed in ashared
logical language
L
 . The precise nature of
L is unimportantin our model (e.g. it could
be a propositional language or a modal language), however it must contain at least the
following:
1. Variables. To represent the issues under negotiation. They have to be variables be-
cause issues need to be bound to different values during negotiation.
2. Constants. To represent values for the issues under negotiation. A special constant
‘?’isneededtorepresenttheabsence ofvalue,andallowforunderdeﬁnedproposals
between agents. (Note this constant does not mean “don’t care”.)
￿ In practice, this set may change dynamically (e.g. new vetting companies may be created and
old ones may disappear). However, since this process can be seen as independent from the
negotiation process,our model is presentedwith respectto a ﬁxed set.
￿ In practice, agentsoften have heterogeneousinformation models and so need to use one of the
variety of techniques for allowing them to interoperate [5, 7]. However, in this work we adopt
the simplest solution and assumea common language.3. Equality. To specify the value of an issue under negotiation.
4. Conjunction.T odeﬁne complex sentences.
All of these features are necessary to express the kinds of sentences involved in the
negotiation proposals discussed in this paper. An example of such a sentence is:
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where ‘
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represented as variables; ‘
 
 
 ’, ‘
H
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g
h’, and ‘
￿’ are values for those issues and so are
constants; ‘
￿’ denotes equality; and ‘
 ’ denotes conjunction. However, the language
deﬁned so far is not expressive enough to describe everything that is involved in a
negotiation. In particular, to ‘reason’ and ‘argue’ about offers it is necessary at the very
least to have some way of expressing preferences between offers. Offers are formulae
in
L, hence the most obvious way of representing preferences between formulae would
be as a second-order relation in
L. However, this would mean that
L wouldbe a higher-
order logic, with the associated computational problems of such logics [6]. As a result
we prefer to express preferences as a meta-language
M
Lwith the followingminimum
requirements:
1. Quotingfunctions. To represent formulae in
L as terms in
M
L.
2. A preference meta-predicate. To express preferences between formulae in
L.
For example, given the sentences
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The common communication language,
C
L, accounts for the set of illocution-
ary particles necessary to model the set of illocutionary acts we study in this pa-
per. The acts can be divided into two sets,
I
n
e
g
o corresponding to negotiation parti-
cles (those used to make offers and counter offers) and
I
p
e
r
s corresponding to per-
suasive particles (those used in argumentation).
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g. Other illocutions could
conceivably be broughtinto
C
Lbut the present set is sufﬁcient for our purposes.
The negotiation dialogue between two agents consists of a sequence of offers and
counter offers containing values for the issues. These offers and counteroffers can be
just conjunctions of ‘
i
s
s
u
e
￿
v
a
l
u
e’p a i r s( offer) or can be accompanied by per-
suasive arguments (threaten, reward, appeal). ‘Persuasion’ is a general term
covering the differentillocutionaryacts by which agents try to change other agent’s be-
liefs and goals. The selection of three persuasive particles in the set
I
p
e
r
s is theresult of
an analysis of the domain, as explained in Section 2, as well as of the persuasion litera-
ture [9, 18]. appeal is a particle with a broad meaning, since there are many different
types of appeal. For example, an agent can appeal to authority,to prevailingpractice or
to self-interest [18]. The structure of the illocutionaryact is
a
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￿,where
  is the argument—aformula in
L or in
M
L, or an illocutionin
C
L—that agent
a communicates to
b in support of a formula
  (which may be a formula either in
L
or
M
L). All types of appeal adhere to this structure. The differing nature of the ap-
peal is achieved by varying the
  in
L or
M
Lor by varying
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understood as the fact that action
  does not take place. threaten and reward
are simpler because they have a narrower range of interpretations. Their structure,
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  again may be illocutions in
C
L. This recursive deﬁnition
allows for a rich set of possible (illocutionary) actions supporting the persuasion. For
instance, agent DD can threaten agent SD that it will inform SD’s boss about SD’s
incompetence if SD does not accept a particular deal:
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Having introduced all the components, we can now describe our dialogical framework
for persuasive negotiation.
Deﬁnition1. A Dialogical Framework is a tuple
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s, assigns a social role to each pair of agents. Social
relations can therefore be viewed as a labelled graph.
4.
L is a logical language
  satisfying the requirements mentioned above.
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eis a discrete totally ordered set of instants.
Note that the time stamp, which appears as the last argument in all illocutions,will be
omited when there is no ambiguity.
Agentscanusetheillocutionsin
C
Laccording to thefollowingnegotiationprotocol
(see Figure 3):
￿ In keeping with the spirit of specifying a framework which is neutral with respect to the agent
architecture, we do not commit to any speciﬁc formal language but note that
L could be as
simple as a propositional languageor as elaborate as a multi-modal BDI logic [10, 14].1. A negotiation always starts with a deal proposal,i . e .a noffer or request.I n
request illocutions the special constant ‘?’ may appear. This is thought of as
a petition to an agent to make a detailed proposal by ﬁlling the ‘?’s with deﬁned
values.
2. This is followed by an exchange of possibly many counter proposals (that agents
may reject) and many persuasive illocutions.
3. Finally, a closing illocutionis uttered, i.e. an accept or withdraw.
4 2
3
1
5
6
offer(a,b,φ)
request(a,b,φ)
Proposal(a,b) Proposal(b,a)
accept(b,a,φ) accept(a,b,φ)
reject(a,b,φ) reject(b,a,φ)
Proposal(b,a)
Proposal(a,b)
Proposal(a,b)
Proposal(b,a)
withdraw(a,b),
withdraw(b,a)
withdraw(a,b),
withdraw(b,a)
Initial state
Final state
withdraw(a,b),
withdraw(b,a)
Fig.3. Negotiation protocol. In
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to the last proposal.
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￿ stands for any illocution constructed with any of the follow-
ing particles: offer, threaten, reward, appeal, andbetweenagents
x and
y.W eo m i tt h e
time stamp in the illocutions.
3.2 Negotiatingagents
The Dialogical Framework described in the previous section represents the static com-
ponents of the negotiationmodel—those that are ﬁxed for all negotiations.This section
presents the dynamic elements—those that change as a particular negotiationproceeds.
Although our model aims to be as neutral as possible about the agent architecture, in
order to capture essential aspects of persuasion it is necessary to assume that the agents
have memory and are deliberative. Memory is expressed by means of an evolving ne-
gotiationstatewhich, in turn,requires the notionof anegotiationthread [12] tocapture
the history of the negotiation dialogue between a pair of agents.
Deﬁnition2. A NegotiationThread between agents
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x
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the set of issues mentioned in illocution
x. That is, we assume monotonicity over
the set of issues under negotiation, so that once an issue has been brought into the
negotiation, it is never supressed. We will use ellipsis whenever useful to make
more compact expressions.
We denote the last illocutionin a thread as
￿
 . We say a negotiationthread
  is active if
￿
  is not an accept or withdraw illocution.
In an extension to our previous work [16], we want to capture the idea that new issues
may arise during the negotiation process. This is necessary because we consider that
one of the main ways in which an agent may persuade another about the desirability
of a particular proposal is to introduce new issues that have hitherto not featured in the
thread. This means that we need an explicit representation of the set
  of issues an
agent is aware of. Preferences also evolve. This may be because
  evolves or because
the agent is persuaded to change its preferences. Thus the agent’s internal theory
T,
which includes its preferences in
M
Land a set of other formulae in
L modelling the
domain, must be explicitly represented in the agent’s state. In this model we do not
impose any speciﬁc requirements on
T. Hence the followingdeﬁnition:
Deﬁnition3. ANegotiationStateforanagent
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H, the negotiation history, is the set of all negotiation threads involving agent
a.
That is,
H
￿
f
 
i
 
a
j
i
 
A
g
e
n
t
s
g.
All possible negotiation states for agent
a will be denoted by
S
a. As an illustration of
how these notions are used, consider the followingexample:
Example1. The CSD agent is negotiating with a
V
C
i agent for the Vet Customer ser-
vice for company A. The CSD agent proposes that the service be completed for
 
 
 
and should take 24 hours.
V
C
i responds that company A is known to be in ﬁnancial
difﬁcultyand therefore a more time consuming and expensive vetting should be under-
taken (Figure 2, id 8). Moreover, in order to meet the deadline,
V
C
i will need to delay
the vetting of another BT customer (company B) for which an agreement has already
been reached. This dialogue may be represented in
C
Las the sequence:
1.
o
f
f
e
r
￿
C
S
D
 
V
C
i
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
￿
A
 
p
r
i
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e
￿
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i
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￿
 
 
h
 
t
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2.
a
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e
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V
C
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C
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m
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￿
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￿
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F
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n
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i
a
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S
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u
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v
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t
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n
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￿
h
i
g
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3.
a
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V
C
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C
S
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￿
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d
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c
c
e
p
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V
C
i
 
C
S
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C
o
m
p
a
n
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￿
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p
r
i
c
e
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t
i
m
e
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h
 
t
 
￿
 
t
 
￿This example shows how the range of issues
  involved in the negotiation is extended
(the delayingof the vet customer service forcompany B) and hownew information(the
fact that company A is known to be in ﬁnancial difﬁculty) can be brought to bear. This
revelation of information means that the CSD agent extends its domain theory
T (to
include the fact that A may not be creditworthy).
3.3 Persuasive agents
As the previous example already showed, the illocutionary acts in
C
L built from
I
p
e
r
s allow arguments to be made in support of a deal. The basic building block
for argumentation is
a
p
p
e
a
l
￿
a
 
b
 
 
 
￿
n
o
t
￿
 
 
t
￿ where
a
 
b
 
A
g
e
n
t
s,
 
 
L
 
M
L,
and
 
 
L
 
M
L
 
C
L. This is read as “agent
a wants agent
b to add
  to
its current theory with argument
￿
n
o
t
￿
  supporting it”. The other persuasive illocu-
tionary acts,
t
h
r
e
a
t
e
n
￿
a
 
b
 
￿
n
o
t
￿
 
 
 
￿
n
o
t
￿
 
 
 
t
￿ and
r
e
w
a
r
d
￿
a
 
b
 
￿
n
o
t
￿
 
 
 
￿
n
o
t
￿
 
 
 
t
￿
with
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
L, can contain arguments as long as
 
  and/or
 
  are appeals, or,
recursively, contain appeals.
The interpretation of a persuasive argument for a formula determines whether the
hearing agent changes its theory. To make a choice the agent considers the (possibly
conﬂicting) arguments coming from other agents, and from itself, as proofs generated
by itsowntheory.Inourdomain, and inotherworkon MAS[2], thesocial rolebetween
the agents is a determining factor in deciding which argument should be preferred.
Hence, an authority relation is derived from the social roles and this is then used as
the mechanism for comparing arguments. Precisely which social roles correspond to a
power relation between the agents depends on the particular domain. In this scenario,
for example, the role ‘contractor’ determines a power relation between the CSD agent
and thevetting companies. To builda directed graph representing theauthoritythat one
agent has over another, we take the labelled graph associated with the social relation
R,
remove the links labelled with non-power roles, and add the necessary links to make
the relation transitive.Hence the followingdeﬁnition:
Deﬁnition4. Given a Dialogical Framework
D
F
￿
h
A
g
e
n
t
s
 
R
o
l
e
s
 
R
 
L
 
M
L
 
C
L
 
T
i
m
e
i and a set of authority roles
P
o
w
e
r
 
R
o
l
e
s,w ed e ﬁne the authority graph,
A
G
 
A
g
e
n
t
s
 
A
g
e
n
t
s,f o r
D
F as:
1. If
R
￿
a
 
b
￿
 
P
o
w
e
rthen
￿
a
 
b
￿
 
A
G
2. If
￿
a
 
b
￿
 
￿
b
 
c
￿
 
A
G then
￿
a
 
c
￿
 
A
G
We say an authority graph is well deﬁned if it is acyclic.
The authority graph encodes the authority relation—or lack of it, since in general AG
is not totally connected—between any two agents. Now, our position is that in this
domain the ‘power’ of an argument is determined solely by the authority of the agents
whichcontributeformulaetoitsconstruction.Hence, itisnecessary toextendthenotion
of authority from a relation between agents, as captured in the authority graph, to a
relation over sets of agents which will be used to establish which arguments to prefer.
There are two obvious ways of deﬁning such a relation. We say that a set of agents
A
has lower minimum authority than
B,
A
￿
m
i
n
B, if and only if for all
b
 
B thereexists
a
 
A such that
￿
b
 
a
￿
 
A
G.A n dt h a t
A has lower maximum authority than
B,
A
￿
m
a
x
B, if and only if for all
a
 
A there exists
b
 
B such that
￿
b
 
a
￿
 
A
G.
Thus, intuitively, the order
￿
m
i
n assumes that if any formula used in the argument was
proposed by somebody low in the authority graph the argument is weak, while
￿
m
a
x
assumes that as soon as any formula in the argument is proposed by somebody high in
the authority graph the argument is strong. Obviously other authority relations might
also be proposed. From now on we refer to any authority relation by the symbol
￿.
In its most general form an argument is a proof for a formula [1]. We assume that
all agents share the same deductive systems for
L (
 
L)a n dM L(
 
M
L). Hence, in this
restricted context, a proof can be represented as the conjunction of all the formulae
used in it because it can be reconstructed by the agent receiving it. An argument is
then a formula
 
 
L
 
M
L
 
C
L that might be constructed from atomic formulae
presentinitiallyinthetheoryoftheagent orobtainedinpreviousnegotiationencounters
from different agents. Assuming the existence of a function
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
￿
L
 
M
L
 
C
L
 
￿
A
g
e
n
t
s that gives the agents whose formulae are used in the constructionof an
argument, or the agent that uttered the illocutionwhen
 
 
C
L. We can use the social
role of those agents to decide how forceful an argument is.
Fundamental to this view of decision making is the idea that one argument may
attack another [3]. We represent the fact that an argument
A
r
g supports a formula
  as
ap a i r
￿
A
r
g
 
 
￿ and the fact that the argument pair
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ attacks
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ by
A
t
t
a
c
k
s
￿
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
￿. The precise meaning of
A
t
t
a
c
k
s depends strongly
on the concrete languages
L and
M
L being used. For the purpose of this paper we
follow Dung [3] in assuming that it is a primitive notion, because our focus is on how
to resolve the effect of an attack no matter how it is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition5. Given the two argument pairs
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ and
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ such that
A
t
t
a
c
k
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￿
￿
A
r
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￿
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
￿ then
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ will be preferred to
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿,
which we write as
￿
A
r
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￿
 
￿
A
r
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￿, if and only if
S
u
p
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o
r
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￿
￿
S
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￿.W h e n
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
￿
A
r
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￿ and
￿
A
r
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￿
 
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ we
say that an agent is indifferent with respect to the arguments—and denote this by
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿.
The agents use argumentation as the means to decide how to interpret incoming and
generate outgoing illocutions.On receiving an argument pair
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ that is not at-
tacked by any argument pair
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ built from its current theory, an open-minded
agent may simply add the argument
A
r
g
  and the formula
 
  to its theory. In contrast,
a more conservative agent may not accept a proposition unless it comes from a higher
authority. When
A
t
t
a
c
k
s
￿
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
￿ the most preferred (in the sense de-
ﬁned above) argument pairis kept.If
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
A
r
g
 
 
 
 
￿ some additionalcriteria
must be applied to decide which to keep, for instance epistemic entrenchment [4].
Example2. The DD and SD agents are negotiatingover the Survey Customer Siteser-
vice. DD proposes that the service should be completed within 24 hours. SD indicates
that one of its surveyors was planning to go on holiday and so the survey will take 48
hours (Figure 2, id 9). DD indicates that it must have the service completed within 24
hours. In
C
Lthis is expressed as:
1.
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D
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D
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￿
In this example, SD issues an appeal to DD for more time to complete the survey ser-
vice. DD rejects this argument saying the service must be completed within 24 hours.
SD now has two arguments that attack one another:
A
t
t
a
c
k
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￿
￿
s
u
r
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e
y
o
r
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
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t
i
m
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￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿. It resolves them by
referring to its authority graph which indicates that the authority of DD’s argument
is more powerful than its own (since DD is its boss, that is,
￿
D
D
 
S
D
￿
 
A
G)
and therefore it must do whatever is necessary to ensure the service is completed
within 24 hours. That is,
S
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S
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￿
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￿
￿
f
D
D
g and given that
￿
D
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S
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A
G we have that
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because in our example
f
S
D
g
￿
f
D
D
g (using either of the measures mentioned
above).
3.4 Interpretation and Generation of Illocutions
For pragmatic reasons, we separate the deﬁnition of the semantics of illocutions into
two different operations,
I and
G (see examples 3 and 4). The former implements the
negotiation-state transition associated with hearing a given illocution, while the latter
determines the illocutionaryaction to be taken in a particular state.
The underlying idea is that any illocutionmay introduce new issues into a negotia-
tion,whileappeals may, inaddition,modifythe preference relationshipsandthe agent’s
theory. However, the actual effect of an illocutiondepends on the agent’s interpretation
of the utterances it receives. This interpretation process is highly domain-speciﬁca n d
is also dependent upon the internal structures present in the agent architecture. For this
reason, we illustrate how our framework can be used to deﬁne a comparatively simple
open-minded agent. Naturally thisdoes not prescribe how all agents shouldbehave, but
rather exempliﬁes the concepts of our model which can be used to deﬁne many other
types of agent.
The illocution interpretation function
I for an open-minded agent is based on the
followingintuitions:
– Every illocution extends the corresponding thread in the negotiation history
 .I n
thisway,forexample, completeillocutionaryhistoriesallowagents withtotalrecall
to be modelled. Forgetful agents can then be modelled by discarding part of the
negotiation thread.
– All illocutionsmay introducenew issues into the negotiation.
– Appeals may change an agent’s preference relationship. They may change the the-
ory as well by extending it with the formulae of the argument in the appeal, pro-
vided that the current theory cannot build attacking arguments for the appeal.
￿ However, we do not update agents’ theories in this minimal semantics because we wish to
keep the interpretation of illocutions reasonably neutral with respect to the agents’ internal
architectures.Example3. Open-minded Interpretation. Given a communication language
C
L,ad i a -
logical framework
D
F, and the set of all possible negotiation states
S
b for an agent
b,
theinterpretationfunctionforan open-mindedagentis deﬁnedby
I
￿
C
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S
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D
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S
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H
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￿
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g,a n d‘
￿’ representing
concatenation— we have
 :
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￿
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￿
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A
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t
a
c
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￿
n
o
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￿
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M
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￿
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  else
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￿
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else
 
 
￿
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￿
T
Finally, an agent
a’s speciﬁcation must include a way of computing the next illocution
to be uttered in the negotiationthread. That is a function
G
￿
S
a
 
D
F
 
C
Lneeds to
be deﬁned. This function must conform with the protocol depicted in Figure 3 and can
conveniently be represented as a collection of condition-action rules, where the action
is an illocutionary action. How an agent chooses which illocution to utter depends on
many factors: the history of the negotiation, the active goals of the agent, or its theory,
and it also depends on the way that particular agent interprets those illocutions. The
following example illustrates a simple negotiation dialogue between two agents and
contains a fragment of a
G function.
Example4. We use an expanded version of the argument presented in Example 2 to
illustratespeciﬁc instances of illocutiongeneration and interpretation functions. Given
the two initialillocutioninterchanges:
1.
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We show two decisions taken by two different types of agent; an ‘authoritarian’ DD
agent which exploits its social power (and threatens to inform the company chairman
that SD did not agree to complete the task within 24h), and a ‘conciliatory’ DD agent
which resorts to an explanatory appeal (that it is company policy that quotes must be
handled within 24h):
3.1 Authoritarian:
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h
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￿
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S
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￿
￿ An alternative way of looking at the interpretation of illocutions is as programs that transform
one state into another.A natural formalism for that interpretation is Dynamic Logic [12].3.2 Conciliatory:
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The
G function of an ‘obedient’ SD agent that, whenever possible, does what it is told
could includethe followingdecision rules where ‘self’ represents the agent interpreting
the illocution:
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￿
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Assuming that
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￿ is true, by
subcontracting the task say, the dialogue with the authoritarianDD ends with:
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On the other hand, if we assume that the rule
B
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e
d is true and DD utters 3.2, the agent could reply with:
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To further illustrate the power of our framework, Figure 4 shows the representation in
C
Lof the arguments presented in Figure 2.
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Fig.4. Formalisation of the arguments presented in Figure 2.4 Related Work
Much of the existing work on agent-based negotiation is rooted in game theory, e.g.
[15]. Although this approach has produced signiﬁcant results, and has been successful
in many negotiation domains, it embodies a number of limiting assumptions about the
agents’ knowledge and utility functions. Even when this approach is extended, as in
[11], to cope with conditions that change over time, it does not address the problem of
how these changes can be accomplished by one agent inﬂuencing another, nor does it
cope with the problem of introducing new issues into negotiations. Changing prefer-
ences through persuasion, in multi-agent systems, was addressed in Sycara’s seminal
work on labour negotiation [18], work extended and formalised by Kraus et al. [10].
However, this work is set within the context of a particular agent architecture, assumes
a ﬁxed and shared domain theory, and deals with ﬁve particular types of argument
(threats, rewards, appeals to precedent, appeals to prevailing practice, and appeals to
self-interest). Furthermore, Kraus et al. do not deal with the introductionof new issues
or imperfect rationality. In contrast, our model accommodates partial knowledge, im-
perfect rationality and the introduction of new negotiation issues—which are relevant
features in many application domains—while only imposing minimal requirements on
agents’ internal states and using a general rhetorical language.
We should also acknowledge the differences between our work and the use of ar-
gumentation to explain how a single agent reasons. In the former, an agent argues with
itself to establish its beliefs. In our work arguments are used by one agent in order to
change another agents’ beliefs and actions. The other important difference is that the
mechanism for resolving conﬂicts between arguments in single agent argumentation is
often built into the logical language in which arguments are constructed and is based
upon some intuitivenotionof what is correct in the world at large. In contrast, we keep
this mechanism at the meta-level and ground it in knowledge about the domain. This
has the dual advantage of ensuring that conﬂicts are resolved in a way that is known
to be suitable for our domain whilst allowingnew conﬂict resolutionmechanisms to be
easily ﬁtted into the model in different domains.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has introduced a novel framework for describing persuasive negotiations
between autonomous agents. This provides a sound foundation for building speciﬁc
artiﬁcial agents by instantiating the generic components such as
L,
M
L and
T.T h e
framework has been strongly inﬂuenced by our experience of business process man-
agement applications and this makes us conﬁdent that it can capture the needs of other
real world applications. However, we realise that there are a number of issues which
require further investigation. Firstly there is the matter of how expressive
C
L is re-
quired to be. For instance, at the moment an agent can only make threats and promises
about illocutionaryactions (e.g. to tell somebody about something). It is also desirable
for non-illocutionary actions to be the consequence of a threat or promise. Similarly,
while appeals could be used to model a wide range of illocutions, it may be useful
to characterise subtly different types of illocution through more reﬁned interpretationand generation functions. Secondly, we have reﬂected an agent’s preferences, and the
changes in those preferences, simply as sentences and updates in the agent’s theory
T.
Further work is required to tie these preferences to notions of rationality, in particular
to standard ideas of expected utility. Finally, we make the simplifyingassumption that
negotiating agents have a common notion of deduction. This may be inadequate for
some domains, in which case it will be necessary for agents to be able to discuss what
rules of inference are appropriate.
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